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Abstract
In this paper, we study the combinatorial agency problem introduced by Babaioﬀ, Feldman
and Nisan [7] and resolve some open questions posed in their original paper. Our results include
a characterization of the transition behavior for the class of threshold functions. This result
conﬁrms a conjecture of [7], and generalizes their results for the transition behavior for the OR
technology and the AND technology. In addition to establishing a (tight) bound of 2 on the
social Price of Unaccountability (POU) for the OR technology for the general case of n>2
agents (the initial paper established this for n = 2, an extended version establishes a bound of 2.5
for the general case), we establish that the POU is unbounded for all other threshold functions
(the initial paper established this only for the case of AND technology). We also obtain a
characterization result for certain compositions of anonymous technologies and establish an
unbounded POU for these cases.
1 Introduction
The classic principal-agent model of microeconomics considers an agent with unobservable, costly
actions, each with a corresponding distribution on outcomes, and a principal with preferences over
outcomes [11, 19]. The principal cannot contract on the action directly (e.g. the amount of eﬀort
exerted), but only on the ﬁnal outcome of the project. The main goal is to design contracts, with a
payment from the principal to the agent conditioned upon the outcome, in order to maximize the
payoﬀ to the principal in equilibrium with a rational, self-interested agent.
The principal-agent model is a classic problem of moral hazard, with agents with potentially
misaligned incentives and private actions. A related theory has considered the problem of moral
hazard on teams of agents [5, 18, 17]. Much of this work involves a continuous action choice by
the agent (e.g., eﬀort) and a continuous outcome function, typically linear or concave in the eﬀort
of the agents. Moreover, rather than considering the design of an optimal contract that maximizes
the welfare of a principal, considering the loss to the principal due to transfers to agents, it is more
typical to design contracts that maximize the total value from the outcome net the cost of eﬀort,
and without consideration of the transfers other than requiring some form of budget balance.
Babaioﬀ et al. [7] introduce the combinatorial agency problem. This a very speciﬁc form of the
moral hazard on team problem in which the agents have binary actions and the outcome is binary,
but where the outcome technology is a complex combination of the inputs of a team of agents.
Each agent is able to exert high or low eﬀort in its own hidden action, with the success or failure
of an overall project depending on the speciﬁc technology function. In particular, these authors
consider the AND technology, in which all agents must exert eﬀort in order for the global project
1to have some possibility of success. Other technologies include: the OR technology, the majority
technology, and nested models such as AND-of-ORs and OR-of-ANDs. This can be conceptualized
as a problem of moral hazard to teams where agents are situated on a graph, each controlling the
eﬀort at a particular vertex.
The combinatorial agency framework considers the social welfare, in terms of the cost to agents
and the value to the principal, that can be achieved in equilibrium under an optimal contract
where the principal seeks a contract that maximizes payoﬀ, i.e. value net of transfers to the agents,
in equilibrium. Thus the focus is on contracts that would be selected by a principal, not be a
designer interested in ﬁnding an equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. In particular, Babaioﬀ
et al. suggest to consider the (social) Price of Unaccountability (POU), which is the worst case
ratio between the optimal social welfare when actions are observable as compared to when they
are not observable. The worst-case is taken over diﬀerent probabilities of success for an individual
agent’s actions (and thus diﬀerent, uncertain technology functions), and over the principal’s value
for a successful outcome. The optimal social welfare is obtained by requesting a particular set of
agents to exert eﬀort, in order to maximize the total expected value to the principal minus the cost
incurred by these agents. In the agency case, the social welfare is again this value net cost, but
optimized under the contract that maximizes the expected payoﬀ of the principal.
The main contribution of this work is to characterize the transition behavior for the k-out-of-n
(or threshold) technology, for n agents and k ∈{ 1,...,n}. The threshold technology is anony-
mous, meaning that the probability of a successful outcome only depends on the number of agents
contracted to for high eﬀort, not the speciﬁc set of agents. Because of this, the transition behav-
ior — a characterization of the optimal contract, which speciﬁes which agents to contract with,
as a function of the principal’s valuation — can be explained in terms of the number of agents
with whom the principal contracts. We establish that the transition behavior (in both the non-
strategic and agency cases) includes a transition from contracting between 0 and l agents for some
1 ≤ l ≤ n, followed by all n − l remaining transitions, for any 0 <α<β<1, where α (resp. β)
is the probability that the action of a low eﬀort (resp. high eﬀort) action by an agent results in a
successful local outcome. This generalizes the prior result of Babaioﬀ et al. [7] for the AND gate
(a single transition from zero agents contracted to all agents contracted) and the OR gate (all n
transitions), and closes an important open question. This result relies on the fact that a single
function can exhibit increasing returns to scale, or IRS, followed by decreasing returns to scale, or
DRS, whereas Babaioﬀ et al. only considered the possibility that a function exhibits either IRS or
DRS. In addition, we use properties of (log) convex functions to establish this result.
Considering the POU, we establish a tight bound of 2 for the OR technology, for all values of
n, α and β =1− α. The initial paper established this POU for the case of n = 2 agents only,
while an extended version of the paper provides a bound of n =2 .5 for the general n>2 case [8].
In addition, we establish that the POU is unbounded for the threshold technology for the general
case of k ≥ 2,n ≥ 2, including Majority. The initial paper established this result only for AND
technology, and so our result closes this for the more general threshold case for any 0 <α<β<1.
More speciﬁcally, we observe that as α → 0, the POU becomes unbounded.
In addition, we consider non-anonymous technology functions such as the Majority-of-AND,
Majority-of-OR, and AND-of-Majority technologies, and study their transition behavior. Our result
regarding the majority technology, and a technical lemma of Babaioﬀ et al., give the transition
behavior for the AND-of-majority technology. In particular, when a majority gate has its ﬁrst
transition to l agents, then the ﬁrst transition as the principal’s value increases under AND-of-
Majority is to l agents on each Majority gate, and then follows the subsequent transitions, with an
additional agent contracted with, in an increment deployed simultaneously on all Majority gates.
2Our result for the Majority-of-OR technology is a bit surprising in that its transition behavior is
similar to the case of the majority technology where there is a single transition from 0 to l followed by
all remaining transitions. Thus far, we have only been able to characterize the transition behavior
for the non-strategic version of Majority-of-OR, but we conjecture a similar transition behavior
for the agency version. Though we have been unable to characterize the transition behavior in
the agency case, we show that the POU for the majority-of-OR technology is unbounded. We
also consider the majority-of-ANDs technology function introduced by [7] and prove the transition
behavior in the non-strategic case consistent with a conjecture of Babaioﬀ et al. [7] for the OR-of-
ANDs. We are unable to prove the transition behavior for the agency case, but show that the POU
is unbounded for the majority-of-ANDs.
We believe that this work is an interesting step in extending the combinatorial agency model in a
direction of interest for crowd sourcing [23, 3, 1, 2]. In particular, it is relevant in applications where
neither the eﬀort nor the individual outcome of each worker is observable. All that is observable
is the ultimate success or failure. One reason for this is that the boundaries between individual
contributions are hard to deﬁne, or that the workers themselves preferred to anonymize or hide
individual contributions in some way (e.g., to protect their privacy.) Another motivation is that it
could be extremely costly, or even impossible, to determine the quality of the work performed by an
individual worker when studied in isolation. One can know whether or not the overall project was a
success or failure (lots of site traﬃc, or no site traﬃc, an overall artifact that passes required tests,
or an artifact that crashes, etc.) but not know whether or not a counterfactual project outcome,
where the work of any one worker was changed, would be diﬀerent. For software engineering, the
work of others to integrate individual components has already been done. For a web site, the
opportunity to launch the site has already passed.
A threshold technology models a domain in which a project only succeeds when enough agents
provide high eﬀort (e.g., Wikipedia or the development of open-source software.) For Majority-
of-OR, consider domains such as TopCoder [4], where mini competitions (e.g. OR gates) are used
for each module and then ultimate success occurs if enough individual modules are judged to be
successful. Many Games with a Purpose [23, 22, 24] can be modeled with a Majority-of-AND
technology, since in an individual game, both agents involved must succeed at their task, however
this task is given to more than one set of agents, and we need a majority of these games (or AND
gates) to succeed in order to verify the quality of the output.
1.1 Related Work
A characterization of the transition behavior and the POU was ﬁrst conjectured for Majority
technology in Babaioﬀ et al. [7], but almost all of the subsequent literature is restricted to read-
once networks [9, 10, 15, 16].
A number of variations of the basic combinatorial agency model have been studied. Considering
contracts that induce mixed Nash equilibria, this can sometimes improve the POU over insisting
on a pure strategy NE, developing a number of upper and lower bound results on the relative gain
from mixed strategies, and identifying a suﬃcient condition under which mixed strategies provide
no advantage to the principal. These authors conjecture that for any technology function, the
relative gain to the principal for inducing a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is bounded above by
a constant. Another variation considers the cost of “free labor”, namely, if there are situations
where the principal can beneﬁt from having certain agents reduce their eﬀort level, even when
this eﬀort is free [10]. The principal is hurt by free labor under the OR technology, because free
labor can lead to free riding, while for the AND technology (and any technology with increasing
3returns to scale), the principal is not hurt by free labor. A third variation allows the principal to
audit some fraction of the agents, and discover their individual private action [14]. Results provide
the transition behavior for AND technology and also give some consideration to Majority and OR
technologies.
Some computational complexity results for identifying optimal contracts have also been devel-
oped. This problem is NP-hard for OR technology [15], and the diﬃculty is later shown to be a
property of unobservable actions [16]. This is in contrast to the AND technology, which is shown
to admit a polynomial time algorithm for computing the optimal contract [15]. An FPTAS is
developed for OR technology, and extended to almost all “series-parallel” technologies [15].
A related topic in economic theory is that of contest design [20, 21, 6, 12]. Contests are situations
in which multiple agents exert eﬀort in order to win a prize. All agents bear the “cost” of the eﬀort
exerted regardless of whether they win a prize. Unlike the moral hazard on teams problem, or the
combinatorial agency problem, the individual outcome from each worker is observable. One agent
is unable to “hide behind” the success or failure of the overall project, since the result from its
own eﬀort are judged in isolation. Moreover, the contest design frameworks do not, to the best
of our knowledge, consider combinations of inputs from workers. Rather, the outcome depends on
the maximum quality outcome generated individually, by each agent. DiPalatino and Vojnovic [13]
analyze a variation with multiple, simultaneous tasks and workers selecting the single task in which
they will participate.
2 Model
In the combinatorial agency model, a principal employs a set of n self-interested agents. Each
agent i has an action space Ai and a cost (of eﬀort) associated with each action ci(ai) ≥ 0 for
every ai ∈ Ai.W el e t￿a −i =( a1,...,a i−1,a i+1,...,a n) denote the action proﬁle of all other agents
besides agent i. Similar to Babaioﬀ et al. [7], we focus on a binary-action model. That is, agents
either exert eﬀort (ai = 1) or do not exert eﬀort (ai = 0), and the cost function becomes ci if
ai = 1 and 0 if ai = 0. If agent i exerts eﬀort, she succeeds with probability βi. If agent i does
not exert eﬀort, she succeeds with probability αi,w h e r e0<α i <β i < 1. We deal with the case
of homogenous agents (e.g. βi = β, αi = α and ci = c for all i), though some of the prior work
deals with the case of heterogenous agents. Sometimes we use the additional assumption of [7],
that β =1− α,w h e r e0<α<1
2.
Completing the description of the technology is the outcome function f,w h i c hd e t e r m i n e st h e
success or failure of the overall project as a function of the success or failure of each agent. Let
￿x =( x1,...,x n), with xi ∈{ 0,1} to denote the success or failure of the action of agent i given its
selected eﬀort level. Following Babaioﬀ et al. [7] we focus on a binary outcome setting, so that the
outcome is 1 (= success) or 0 (= failure.) Given this, we study the following outcome functions:
1. AND technology: f(x1,x 2,...,x n)=∧i∈Nxi. In other words, the project succeeds if and only
if all agents succeed in their tasks.
2. OR technology: f(x1,x 2,...,x n)=∨i∈Nxi. In other words, the project succeeds if and only
if at least one agent succeeds in her task.
3. Majority technology: f(x) = 1 if a majority of the xi are 1. In other words, the project
succeeds if and only if a majority of the agents succeed at their tasks.1
1Note that this is diﬀerent from the AND and OR technologies function since this is not a “read-once” network.
44. Threshold technology: We can generalize the majority technology into a threshold technology,
where f(x) = 1 if and only if at least k of the xi are 1, e.g. at least k of the n agents succeed
in their tasks.
In fact, the threshold technology is a generalization of the OR, AND and majority technologies,
since the k = 1 case is equivalent to the OR technology, the k = n case is equivalent to the AND
technology, and the k = ￿n
2￿ case is equivalent to the majority technology. It should be noted that
the set of threshold technologies is exactly the set of threshold functions. It is easy to see that each
of these outcome functions is anonymous, meaning that the outcome is invariant to a permutation
on the agent identities.
Given outcome function f, and success probabilities α and β, then action proﬁle ￿a induces a
probability p(￿a ) ∈ [0,1] with which the project will succeed. This is just
p(￿a )=E￿x [f(￿x ) | ￿x ∼ ￿a ] (1)
where the local outcomes ￿x are distributed according to α,β and as a result of the eﬀort ￿a by
agents. Since p considers the combined eﬀect of technology f, α and β,t h e nw er e f e rt op as the
technology function.
The principal has a value v for a successful outcome and 0 for an unsuccessful outcome. Like [7],
we assume that the principal is risk-neutral and seeks to maximize expected value minus expected
payments to agents. The principal is unable to observe either the actions ￿a or the (local) outcomes
￿x . The only thing the principal can observe is the success or failure of the overall project. Based
on this, a contract speciﬁes a payment ti ≥ 0 to each agent i when the project succeeds, with a
payment of zero otherwise. The principal can pay the agents, but not ﬁne them. It is convenient to
include in a contract the set of agents that the principal intends to exert high eﬀort; this is the set
of agents that will exert high eﬀort when the principal selects an appropriate payment function.
The utility to agent i under action proﬁle ￿a is ui(￿a )=ti · p(￿a ) − ci if the agent exerts eﬀort,
and ui(￿a )=ti · p(￿a ) otherwise. The principal’s expected utility is u(￿a )=v · p(￿a ) −
￿
i∈N ti · p(￿a ).
The principal’s task is to design a contract so that its utility is maximized under an action proﬁle
￿a that is a Nash equilibrium. We make the same assumption as Babaioﬀ et al. [7], that if there are
multiple Nash equilibria (NE), the principal can contract for the best NE.2 The social welfare for
an action proﬁle ￿a is given by u(￿a )+
￿
i∈N ui(￿a )=v · p(￿a ) −
￿
i∈N ci · ai, with payments from the
principal to the agents canceling out.
Throughout, we focus on outcome functions that are monotonic, so that f(￿x )=1 ⇒ f(x￿
1,￿ x −1)=
1 for x￿
1 ≥ x1. Based on this, then the technology function p is also monotonic in the amount of
eﬀort exerted, that is for all i and all ￿a −i ∈{ 0,1}n−1, p(1,￿ a−i) ≥ p(0,￿ a−i). Similarly, a technology
function p is anonymous if it symmetric with respect to the players. That is, it is anonymous if
it only depends on the number of agents that exert eﬀort and is indiﬀerent to permutations of the
joint action proﬁle ￿a . This is true whenever the underlying outcome function is anonymous.
In the non-strategic variant of the problem, the principal can choose which agents exert eﬀort
and these agents need not be “motivated”, the principal can simply bear their cost of exerting
eﬀort. Let S∗
a and S∗
ns denote the optimal set of agents to contract with in the agency case and the
A read-once network is a network that can be represented by a graph with a labeled source and sink, where there
is a unique player corresponding to each edge. The project succeeds if and only if there exists a path, consisting of
successful players, between the source and the sink [7]. Much of the previous work on the combinatorial agency prob-
lem applies to read-once networks and thus the understanding of the majority technology seems less well understood
than the AND, OR, AND-of-ORs and OR-of-ANDs technologies.
2This is reasonable, since the principal can announce which set of agents should exert eﬀort and also design the
payment to provide strict incentive to exert eﬀort for those contracted.
5non-strategic case respectively. That is, these sets of agents are those that maximize the expected
value to the principal net cost, ﬁrst where the sets must be induced in a Nash equilibrium and
second when they can be simply selected.
Deﬁnition 2.1. [7] The Price of Unaccountability (POU) for an outcome function f is deﬁned as
the worst case ratio (over v, α and β) of the social welfare in the non-strategic case and the social
welfare of the agency case:
POU(f)= s u p
v>0,α,β
p(S∗
ns(v)) · v −
￿
i∈S∗
ns(v) ci
p(S∗
a(v)) · v −
￿
i∈S∗
a(v) ci
, (2)
where p is the technology function induced by f, α and β,w i t h0<α<β<1.
In studying the POU, it becomes useful to characterize the transition behavior for a technology.
The transition behavior is, for a ﬁxed technology function p, the optimal set of contracted agents
as a function of the principal’s value v. We know that when v = 0 it is optimal to contract with 0
agents and likewise, as v →∞ , it is optimal to contract with all agents. However, we would like
to understand what are the optimal sets of agents contracted between these two extreme cases.
There are, in fact, two sets of transitions, for both the agency and the non-strategic case. For
anonymous technologies, there can be at most n transitions in either case, since the number of
agents in the optimal contract is (weakly) monotonically increasing in the principal’s value. We
seek to understand how many transitions occur, and the nature of each “jump” (i.e. the change
in number of agents contracted with at a transition.)
We also consider compositions of these technologies such as majority-of-AND, Majority-of-
OR, and AND-of-Majority. These technologies are no longer anonymous. For example, in the
AND-of-Majority case, one can imagine that the probability of success will be diﬀerent when i
agents are contracted on the same majority function and when they are contracted on i diﬀerent
majority functions. With non-anonymous technologies, one needs to specify the contracted set of
agents, in addition to the number of agents contracted. In considering composition of anonymous
technologies, we assume we are composing identical technology functions, e.g. each AND gate in
the majority-of-AND technology consists of the same number of agents.
3 Transition Behavior of the Optimal Contract
Below we will characterize the transition behavior of the threshold technology, which gives us the
transition behavior for the majority technology. We show that there exists an l ∈{ 1,...,n} such
that the ﬁrst transition is from 0 to l agents followed by all remaining transitions. This result holds
for any value of α,β such that 0 <α<β<1.
Our proof builds on the framework of Babaioﬀ et al. [7]. In Babaioﬀ et al., it was shown that the
AND technology always exhibits “increasing returns to scale” (IRS) and the OR technology always
exhibits “decreasing returns to scale” (DRS). It was also shown that any anonymous technology
that exhibits IRS has a single transition from 0 to n agents for the optimal contract in the non-
strategic case and that any anonymous technology that exhibits DRS exhibits all n transitions in
the non-strategic case. Similar to the non-strategic case, it was shown in Babaioﬀ et al. that the
AND technology always exhibits overpayment (OP), in the agency case, where the OP condition
guarantees a single transition from 0 to n, and the OR technology always exhibits increasing
relative marginal payment (IRMP), in the agency case, where the IRMP condition guarantees all
n transitions.
6We show that the threshold technology exhibits IRS up to a certain number of agents contracted
and DRS thereafter, which gives the transition characterization for the non-strategic case. Likewise,
we show that the threshold function exhibits OP to a point and IRMP in the agency case, which
is suﬃcient to give the transition characterization for the agency case. Our analysis is new, in
the sense that we consider the possibility that a single technology can exhibit IRS up to a certain
number of agents contracted, followed by DRS and likewise, that it can exhibit OP up to a certain
number of agents contracted, followed by IRMP. Babaioﬀ et al. only considered the possibility a
function exhibits either IRS or DRS, and likewise, either OP or IRMP. In addition to this insight,
we use properties of (log) convex functions to establish this result. We state our main theorems
that give a complete characterization of the transition behavior of the majority technology below:
Theorem 3.12 For any threshold technology (any k, n, c, α and β) in the non-strategic case,
there exists an 1 ≤ lns ≤ n where, such that the ﬁrst transition is from 0 to lns agents, followed by
all remaining n − lns transitions.
Theorem 3.17 For any threshold technology (any k, n, c, α and β) in the agency case, there
exists an 1 ≤ la ≤ lns such that the ﬁrst transition is from 0 to la agents, followed by all remaining
n − la transitions.
The following observations give us the optimal payment rule for any technology and establish
a monotonic property for the optimal contract as a function of v.
Deﬁnition 3.1. [7] The marginal contribution of agent i for a given a−i is denoted by ∆i(￿a −i)=
p(1,￿ a−i) − p(0,￿ a−i), and is the diﬀerence in the probability of success of the technology function
when agent i exerts eﬀort and when she does not.
For anonymous technologies, if exactly j entries in ￿a −i are 1, then ∆i = pj+1 − pj,w h e r epj is
the probability of success when exactly j agents exert eﬀort. Since p is strictly monotone, we have
∆i > 0 for all i.
Remark 3.2. [7] The best contracts (from the principal’s point of view) that induce the action
proﬁle ￿a ∈{ 0,1}n as a Nash equilibrium are ti =0when the project is unsuccessful and ti = ci
∆i(￿a −i)
when the project succeeds and the principal requests eﬀort ai =1from agent i.
The following remark of Babaioﬀ et al. [7] establishes that the optimal contract for an anonymous
technology function is (weakly) monotonically increasing with the principal’s value and is used in
establishing Lemma 3.6.
Remark 3.3. [7] For any anonymous technology function p, if contracting with k1 agents is
optimal for v1, and contracting with k2 agents is optimal for v2,a n dv1 >v 2, then k1 ≥ k2.
The following two lemmas are from [7] and are used in the proof of Lemma 3.6, which gives a
suﬃcient condition for a technology function to have a ﬁrst transition to l, followed by all remaining
transitions. Let Qi be the total expected payment when contracting with i agents, or in other words,
Qi =
pi·i·c
pi−pi−1 = pi · i · ti. In the non-strategic case, let Qi be the total sum of costs of the number
of agents contracted, or in other words, Qi = i · c. Note that the following lemmas hold in both
the non-strategic case and the agency case. Finally, let vi,j denote the speciﬁc principal’s value at
which he is indiﬀerent between contracting with i agents or j agents in the agency case. For the
non-strategic case, vi,j is the principal’s value at which he is indiﬀerent between i agents exerting
eﬀort and j agents exerting eﬀort. More formally, the point vi,j at which the principal is indiﬀerent
between contracting between i agents and j agents can be expressed as pi ·vi,j −Qi = pj ·vi,j −Qj.
Solving for vi,j, we get that vi,j =
Qj−Qi
pj−pi . In what follows, we mainly consider the value of v0,i for
7all i and the value of vi,i+1 for all i.W ed e ﬁ n eu(i,v) as the utility to the principal of contracting
with i agents when his value is v. In other words, u(i,v)=pi·v−Qi,w h e r eQi is the total expected
payment, either in the non-strategic case or the strategic case.
Lemma 3.4. [7] u(l,v0,l) >u (i,v0,l) for all i ￿= l if and only if
Qi
Ql >
pi−p0
pl−p0 for all i ￿= l.
Lemma 3.5. [7] u(i,vi−1,i) >u (i+1,v i,i+1) for all i>lif and only if
Qi+1−Qi
ti+1−ti >
Qi−Qi−1
ti−ti−1 for all
i>l .
The following lemma gives a set of suﬃcient conditions for an anonymous technology to have
a ﬁrst transition from 0 to l, for some l ∈{ 1,...,n}, followed by all remaining n − l transitions.
This lemma holds for both the non-strategic case (by setting Qi = i · c) and the agency case (by
setting Qi = i·c
∆i). We view this lemma as a generalization of Theorem 9 from [7] and it follows a
similar proof structure. This lemma states that as long as a technology function exhibits OP up
to a certain number of agents contracted followed by IRMP, then the transition behavior involves
a ﬁrst transition from 0 to l, for some l ∈{ 1,...,n}, followed by all remaining n − l transitions.
Lemma 3.6. Any anonymous technology function that satisﬁes:
1.
Qi
Ql >
pi−p0
pl−p0 for all i ￿= l
2.
Ql+1−Ql
pl+1−pl >
Ql
pl−p0
3.
Qi+1−Qi
pi+1−pi >
Qi−Qi−1
pi−pi−1 for all i>l
for some l ∈{ 1,...,n} has a ﬁrst transition from 0 to l and then all n − l subsequent transitions,
where Qi is deﬁned appropriate for the non-strategic case or the agency case.
Now that we have established a set of suﬃcient conditions for an anonymous technology to
exhibit a ﬁrst transition from 0 to l, followed by all remaining transitions (for either the non-
strategic case or the agency case), we interpret what these conditions are for the non-strategic
case.
Lemma 3.7. Any anonymous technology that has a probability of success function that satisﬁes:
1.
pi−p0
i >
pi−1−p0
i−1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ l and
pi−p0
i <
pi−1−p0
i−1 for all i>l
2. 1
pi+1−pi > 1
pi−pi−1 for all i>l
for some l ∈{ 1,...,n} has a ﬁrst transition from 0 to l and then all n−l subsequent transitions for
the nonstrategic version of the problem.
In establishing that the threshold technology satisﬁes the conditions outlined in Lemma 3.7, it
becomes useful to deﬁne a property of the probability of success function.
Deﬁnition 3.8. We say that a probability of success p for a particular technology is unimodal if
it satisﬁes one of three alternatives:
1. pi − pi−1 >p i−1 − pi−2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ j and pi − pi−1 <p i−1 − pi−2 for all i>j
2. pi − pi−1 >p i−1 − pi−2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n
3. pi − pi−1 <p i−1 − pi−2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n
8Let f(i)=
pi−p0
i . This function is useful to consider, because in order to establish the ﬁrst
condition of Lemma 3.7, we need to show that f(i) is unimodal.
Lemma 3.9. If the probability of success function is unimodal over the set {1,...,n}, then we know
that f(i) is also unimodal.
Corollary 3.10. For any anonymous technology function (p,c) that has a unimodal probability of
success, there exists an 1 ≤ l ≤ n such that the ﬁrst transition in the non-strategic case is from 0
to l agents (where l is the smallest value that satisﬁes
pl−p0
l >
pl+1−p0
l+1 ) followed by all remaining
n − l transitions.
Therefore, it suﬃces to show that p is unimodal in order to establish that the technology (p,c)
exhibits a ﬁrst transition from 0 to l, for some l ∈{ 1,...,n}, followed by all remaining n − l
transitions, in the non-strategic case.
Lemma 3.11. The probability of success function for any threshold technology is unimodal.
The characterization of the transition behavior of the threshold technology in the non-strategic
case follows from Lemmas 3.7, 3.9, and 3.11.
Theorem 3.12. For any threshold technology (any k, n, c, α and β) in the non-strategic case,
there exists an 1 ≤ lns ≤ n where, such that the ﬁrst transition is from 0 to lns agents, followed by
all remaining n − lns transitions.
Now that we have characterized the transition behavior of the threshold technology, for any
k, in the non-strategic case, we focus on establishing the conditions of Lemma 3.6, for the agency
case. The following lemma is used to show that the ﬁrst condition in Lemma 3.6 is satisﬁed by the
threshold technology.
Lemma 3.13. The discrete valued function,
Qi
pi−p0, is convex.
Lemma 3.14. There exists a value of 1 ≤ la ≤ n such that
Qi
Qla >
pi−p0
pla−p0 for all i ￿= la.
Since there exists an la such that
Qi
pi−p0 >
Qi+1
pi+1−p0 for all 1 ≤ i<l a and
Qi
pi−p0 <
Qi+1
pi+1−p0 for all
la ≤ i<n , we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.15. We have
Qla+1−Qla
pla+1−pla >
Qla
pla−p0, where 1 ≤ la ≤ n satisﬁes
Qi
Qla >
pi−p0
pla−p0 for all
i ￿= la.
Lemma 3.16. We have
Qi+1−Qi
pi+1−pi >
Qi−Qi−1
pi−pi−1 for all i>l a where la is the smallest value such that
Qla
pla−p0 <
Qla+1
pla+1 .
Lemmas 3.6, 3.14, 3.16 and 3.18 and Corollary 3.15 establish the following result.
Theorem 3.17. For any threshold technology (any k, n, c, α and β) in the agency case, there
exists an 1 ≤ la ≤ lns such that the ﬁrst transition is from 0 to la agents, followed by all remaining
n − la transitions.
Finally we show that the ﬁrst transition in the agency is at most the value of the ﬁrst transition
in the non-strategic.
Lemma 3.18. For any threshold technology, we get la ≤ lns.
Below we give the trend in transition behavior as a function of β,w h e nα = 0.
Remark 3.19. For any threshold technology with ﬁxed k ≥ 2, n, c and α =0 , we have that l = k
for β close enough to 1 and l = n for β close enough to 0.
94 Price of Unaccountability
In this section, we provide results regarding the Price of Unaccountability for OR and threshold
technologies.
Lemma 4.1. [7] For any technology function, the price of unaccountability is obtained at some
value v which is a transition point, of either the agency or the non-strategic cases.
We are able to improve slightly upon this result, for the OR technology, which is needed to
establish Theorem 4.5. We suspect that this result can be improved further, in that the POU
occurs at the ﬁrst transition in the agency case.
Lemma 4.2. For the OR technology, the price of unaccountability occurs at a transition in the
agency case, as opposed to a transition in the non-strategic case.
The following theorem is a result of Babaioﬀ et al. [7], where they derive the price of unaccount-
ability for AND technology where β =1− α. (In fact, they give the price of unaccountability for
any anonymous technology with a single transition in both the agency and non-strategic cases.) It
is easy to see from the closed form expression of the POU that POU →∞as α → 0.
Theorem 4.3. [7] For the AND technology with α =1− β, the price of unaccountability occurs
at the transition point of the agency case and is POU =(1
α − 1)n−1 +( 1− α
1−α).
Remark 4.4. [7] The price of unaccountability for the AND technology is not bounded. More
speciﬁcally, POU →∞as α → 0 and POU →∞as β → 0.
In their original paper, Babaioﬀ et al. [7] show that the Price of Unaccountability for the OR
technology is bounded by 2 for exactly 2 agents and give an upper bound of 2.5 for the general
case [8], when β =1− α. We extend these results for the β =1− α case and show that the
Price of Unaccountability is bounded above by 2 for any OR technology (i.e. for all n). This result
is tight, namely, as α → 0, POU → 2. We suspect that these results hold for the more general
0 <α<β<1 case, but we have been unable to prove it for all values of α, β.
Theorem 4.5. The POU for the OR technology is bounded by 2 for all α,β =1− α and n.
The following remark follows from the proof of Theorem 4.5.
Remark 4.6. For any n,a sα → 0, POU → 2 for the OR technology.
In contrast to the OR technology, we show that the POU for the threshold technology with
k ≥ 2 is unbounded. This result holds for any 0 <α<β<1.
Theorem 4.7. The Price of Unaccountability for the threshold technology is not bounded for all
values of k ≥ 2 and n. More speciﬁcally, when α → 0, POU →∞ .
Lemma 4.8. As α → 0, we know that k ≤ la ≤ lns, where la is the ﬁrst transition in the agency
case and lns is the ﬁrst transition in the non-strategic case.
It should be noted that there is interesting structure to the social welfare ratio as a function
of the principal’s value v. For a ﬁxed number of agents contracted in the agency case, the social
welfare ratio is increasing. However, at a transition in the agency case, the social welfare ratio drops
signiﬁcantly such that the maximum ratio for each successive agency contract never reaches the
maximum ratio for the previous agency contract. Proving this behavior could be useful in studying
the Price of Unaccountability for restricted of v and α.
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In this section, we study the composition of various technology functions. For the majority-of-AND
and majority-of-OR technology, we are unable to provide the characterization of transition behavior
for the agency case, but we provide the characterization of transition behavior in the non-strategic
case and we provide a result regarding the Price of Unaccountability.
5.1 Majority-of-ANDs
We prove the transition behavior for the majority-of-AND technology in the non-strategic case.
These results for the more general threshold-of-ORs case. For the following assume that in the
majority-of-AND technology, the majority gate contains q AND gates, each with m agents. This
builds on a conjecture of Babaioﬀ et al. who conjecture the following behavior for both the non-
strategic and agency cases. We are unable to prove the transition behavior for the agency case.
Lemma 5.1. If the principal decides to contract with j · m + a agents for some j ∈ Z+ and some
0 ≤ a<m , the probability of success is maximized by fully contracting j AND gates and contracting
with a remaining agents on the same AND gate.
Lemma 5.2. For any principal’s value v, the optimal contract involves a set of fully contracted
AND gate.
Theorem 5.3. The transition behavior for the majority-of-AND technology in the non-strategic
case has a ﬁrst transition to l fully contracted AND gates, where 1 ≤ l ≤ n, followed by each
subsequent transition of fully contracted AND gates.
While we are unable to characterize the transition behavior for the majority-of-AND technology
in the agency case, we know that the ﬁrst transition in the agency case must involve contracting
at most l·m agents (proof similar to that of Lemma 4.8). This allows us to prove that the Price of
Unaccountability is unbounded. The proof of Theorem 5.4 is omitted but has a virtually identical
proof as Theorem 4.7.
Theorem 5.4. The Price of Unaccountability is unbounded for the majority-of-AND technology.
5.2 Majority of ORs
We will characterize the transition behavior for the non-strategic case of the majority of ORs below.
In what follows, we assume that each OR gate has j agents and there are m of them comprising
a majority function (i.e. n = j · m). We also assume that k = ￿m
2 ￿.3 Since the following lemma
is a statement regarding the probability of success, it holds for both the non-strategic and agency
cases, because the probability of success is the same in both. In considering the majority-of-OR
case, we further assume that β =1− α and 0 <α<1
2.
Lemma 5.5. Consider an integer i such that i = a · m + b, where 0 ≤ b<m .F i x i n g i,t h e
probability of success for a majority-of-ORs function is maximized when a+1agents are contracted
on each of b OR gates and a agents are contracted on each of n − b OR gates.
The following lemma gives the complete transition behavior in the majority-of-OR technology
in the nonstrategic case.
3It should be noted that these results do not hold for the more general threshold-of-ORs case. In fact we can
construct a setting where this transition behavior will not occur.
11Lemma 5.6. The ﬁrst transition for the non-strategic case of the majority-of-OR technology jumps
from contracting with 0 agents to l agents, where 1 ≤ l ≤ k, followed by all remaining transitions,
where the transitions proceed in such a way so that no OR gate has more than 1 more agent
contracted as compared to any other OR gate.
We conjecture that a similar transition behavior holds in the agency case, but we have thus far
been unable to prove it. Although we have been unable to characterize the transition behavior in
the agency case, we do know that as α → 0, the ﬁrst transition jumps to k. While we omit the
proof of this lemma, it is very similar to Lemma 4.8. This is enough to determine that the POU is
unbounded.
Lemma 5.7. In the agency case of the majority-of-OR technology, as α → 0,t h eﬁ r s tt r a n s i t i o n
occurs to a value k.
The following theorem has a similar proof to Theorem 4.7.
Theorem 5.8. The Price of Unaccountability is unbounded for the majority-of-OR technology.
5.3 AND of Majority
In what follows, we will also characterize the transition behavior of AND-of-majorities. Similar to
the previous case, these results hold for the more general AND-of-threshold’s. We give a result
from [7] that allows for the characterization of the transition behavior of AND-of-majority. Let g
and h be two Boolean functions on disjoint inputs with any cost vectors, and let f = g ∧ h. An
optimal contract S for f for some v is composed of some agents from the g-part (denoted by the
set R) and some agents from the h-part (denoted by the set T).
Lemma 5.9. [7] Let S be an optimal contract for f = g ∧h on v. Then, T is an optimal contract
for h on v · tg(R),a n dR is an optimal contract for g on v · th(T).
The previous lemma gives us a characterization of the transition behavior in the AND-of-
majorities technology. The statement of this result is analogous to the result given in [7] for the
AND-of-ORs technology. Since the previous lemma holds for both the non-strategic and agency
variations of the problem, the following theorem holds for both the non-strategic and agency vari-
ations of the problem.
Theorem 5.10. Let h be an anonymous majority technology and let f =
￿nc
j=1 be the AND of
majority technology that is obtained by a conjunction of nc of these majority technology functions
on disjoint inputs. Then for any value v, an optimal contract contracts with the same number of
agents in each majority component.
Theorem 5.10 gives us a complete characterization of the transition behavior in the AND-of-
majorities technology for both the non-strategic and the agency cases. Since we know that the ﬁrst
transition in both the agency and non-strategic cases for the AND-of-majority technology occurs
to a value greater than 1, we have the following result. The proof structure is similar to that of
Theorem 4.7.
Theorem 5.11. The Price of Unaccountability is unbounded for the AND-of-majority technology.
126 Conclusions
In this work, we advance the understanding of the combinatorial agency model. We prove the
transition behavior for the threshold technology for general α,β. We study the majority technology,
the majority-of-OR technology, and the AND-of-majority technology and observe the connection
between these technologies and crowdsourcing systems. Babaioﬀ et al. [7] showed that the POU
was not bounded for the AND technology, for any n. We strengthen this result, and prove that the
POU is not bounded for the threshold technology for all k ≥ 2, any n ≥ 2, and any 0 <α<β<1.
More speciﬁcally, the POU for the threshold technology (with k ≥ 2) approaches ∞ as α → 0.
Babaioﬀ et al. [7] showed that the POU was bounded by 2 for the OR technology with 2 agents
and bounded by 2.5 in the general case [8]. We show that the POU is bounded by 2 for the OR
technology for all values of α,β =1− α and n and this bound is tight.
While we do not study the entire class of anonymous functions, we do study a natural class
in the k-out-of-n (or threshold) technology. The entire class of anonymous functions is easy to
characterize using the set of “exact-value” functions [25]. The “exact value” function Ek is 1 if and
only if exactly k agents succeed and 0 otherwise. The set of exact-value functions form a basis for
the class of anonymous functions, or in other words, any anonymous function f can be written as
follows: f(x)=
￿
0≤k≤n Ek(x) ∧ vk,w h e r e( v0,...,v n) ∈{ 0,1}n+1 and x is the success vector of the
agents [25]. We leave studying the entire class of anonymous functions as a direction for future work.
In fact, we suspect that the threshold technology has a more well-behaved transition behavior than
other anonymous functions. This would imply that the threshold function is a desirable technology
for crowdsourcing work and is the most signiﬁcant open direction.
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A Proofs from Section 3
Lemma 3.6 Any anonymous technology function that satisﬁes:
1.
Qi
Ql >
pi−p0
pl−p0 for all i ￿= l
2.
Ql+1−Ql
pl+1−pl >
Ql
pl−p0
3.
Qi+1−Qi
pi+1−pi >
Qi−Qi−1
pi−pi−1 for all i>l
for some l ∈{ 1,...,n} has a ﬁrst transition from 0 to l and then all n − l subsequent transitions,
where Qi is deﬁned appropriate for the non-strategic case or the agency case.
14Proof. From Lemma 3.4, we know that if
Qi
Ql >
pi−p0
pl−p0 for all i ￿= l,t h e nu(l,v0,l) >u (i,v0,l) for all
i ￿= l. By Remark 3.3, since l is the optimal contract at v0,l, for any v>v 0,l, it must be the case
that the optimal contract involves contracting with at least l agents. Likewise, since 0 is optimal at
v0,l, by Remark 3.3, if i were optimal for any v<v 0,l, then 0 could not be optimal at v0,l. Therefore
we know that for all v<v 0,l, contracting with 0 agents is the only optimal contract. Since at v0,l,
the only optimal contracts are 0 and l, there is no value of v for which it is optimal to contract
with i ∈ 1,2,...,l− 1 agents. Thus the technology function exhibits a jump between contracting
between 0 agents and contracting with l agents.
From Lemma 3.5, we know that if
Qi+1−Qi
pi+1−pi >
Qi−Qi−1
pi−pi−1 for all i>l ,t h e nu(i,vi−1,i) >u (i +
1,v i,i+1) for all i>l . Also, we know that the statement
Qi+1−Qi
pi+1−pi >
Qi−Qi−1
pi−pi−1 for all i>l ,i s
equivalent to vi,i+1 >v i−1,i for all i>l .S i n c e
Ql+1−Ql
pl+1−pl >
Ql
pl−p0, we also know that vl,l+1 >v 0,l.
In what follows, we show that for any v ∈ (vi−1,i,v i,i+1) for some i>l , contracting with exactly
i agents is the only optimal contract. If we combine this with the fact that 0 is optimal for all
v ≤ v0,l and the fact that n is optimal for all v ≥ vn−1,n we get that the ﬁrst transition occurs from
0t ol and all remaining n − l transitions occur.
Now consider any value v ∈ (v0,l,v l,l+1), we know that contracting with l agents yields higher
utility to the principal than contracting with j<lagents from above. Likewise, consider any value
v ∈ (vl,l+1,v l+1,l+2), we know know by the deﬁnition of vl,l+1, that contracting with l + 1 agents is
strictly better than contracting with l agents for all v>v l,l+1 and we know that contracting with
l+1 agents is strictly better than contracting with j agents, where j<l , since contracting with l is
strictly better than contracting with j<lagents for all v>v 0,l. Now we will proceed inductively
(much like the proof of Theorem 9 in [7]), as follows: consider any value v ∈ (vi,i+1,v i+1,i+2) for
any i>l , we know that contracting with i + 1 is strictly better than contracting with i for all
v>v i,i+1. We know that contracting with i + 1 agents is strictly better than contracting with j
agents, where j<i , because the induction hypothesis gives us that contracting with i agents is
strictly better than contracting with j<iagents.
Now we induct backwards as in [7]. Consider the v>v n−1,n, we know that contracting with n
agents has strictly greater utility than contracting with j>nagents (trivially true). Now consider
v ∈ (vi−1,i,v i,i+1) for all l<i<n , contracting with i agents is strictly better than contracting with
i + 1 agents by the deﬁnition of vi,i+1 and by the induction hypothesis, we know that contracting
with i agents is strictly better than contracting with j>i +1 agents. Now consider v ∈ (v0,l,v l,l+1),
we know that contracting with l agents is strictly better than contracting with l + 1 agents and
all j>l + 1 agents, by the induction hypothesis. Finally consider v ∈ (0,v 0,l), we know that
contracting with 0 agents is strictly better than contracting with j ∈{ 1,2,...,l} agents from above.
The induction hypothesis gives us that contracting with 0 agents is strictly better than contracting
with j>lagents.
Combining the two inductive arguments gives us that contracting with 0 agents is optimal for
v ∈ (0,v 0,l), contracting with l agents is optimal for v ∈ (v0,l,v l,l+1) and contracting with i +1
agents is optimal for v ∈ (vi,i+1,v i+1,i+2) for all i ≥ l.
Lemma 3.7 Any anonymous technology that has a probability of success function that satisﬁes:
1.
pi−p0
i >
pi−1−p0
i−1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ l and
pi−p0
i <
pi−1−p0
i−1 for all i>l
2. 1
pi+1−pi > 1
pi−pi−1 for all i>l
for some l ∈{ 1,...,n} has a ﬁrst transition from 0 to l and then all n−l subsequent transitions for
the nonstrategic version of the problem.
15Proof. We show that the conditions of Lemma 3.6 are satisﬁed. Since Qi = i·c for the nonstrategic
case, the condition that
Qi
Ql >
pi−p0
pl−p0 for all i ￿= l is equivalent to i
l >
pi−p0
pl−p0 for all i ￿= l or
pl−p0
l >
pi−p0
i , for all i ￿= l. The latter is clearly satisﬁed by condition 1 of this Lemma. The condition
Qi+1−Qi
pi+1−pi >
Qi−Qi−1
pi−pi−1 for all i>lis equivalent to 1
pi+1−pi > 1
pi−pi−1 for all i>l , which is equivalent to
condition 3 of this Lemma. The condition
Ql+1−Ql
pl+1−pl >
Ql
pl−p0 is equivalent to 1
pl+1−pl > l
pl−p0.S i n c e
condition 1 of this Lemma gives us
pl−p0
l >
pl+1−p0
l+1 ,w ek n o w
pl−p0
l >p l+1 − pl, which gives us the
desired result.
Lemma 3.9 If the probability of success function is unimodal over the set {1,...,n},t h e nw e
know that f(i) is also unimodal.
Proof. If pi − pi−1 >p i−1 − pi−2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n,t h e n
pi−p0
i >
pi−1−p0
i−1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n
as well. Likewise, if pi − pi−1 <p i−1 − pi−2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n,t h e n
pi−p0
i <
pi−1−p0
i−1 for all
2 ≤ i ≤ n as well. Finally, consider the case that pi − pi−1 >p i−1 − pi−2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ j and
pi − pi−1 <p i−1 − pi−2 for all i>j .S i n c epi − pi−1 >p i−1 − pi−2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ j, we know that
pi−p0
i >
pi−1−p0
i−1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ j. Now consider the smallest value of l for which
pl−p0
l <
pl−1−p0
l−1 .
Note that if pl − pl−1 >p l−1 − pl−2 >. . .>p 1 − p0, it must be the case that
pl−p0
l >
pl−1−p0
l−1 ,s o
therefore we know that pl − pl−1 <p l−1 − pl−2. We also know that pl − pl−1 <
pl−1−p0
l−1 .S i n c e
pl+1 − pl <p l − pl−1 <
pl−1−p0
l−1 , we know that pl+1 − pl <
pl−p0
l , and therefore
pl+1−p0
l+1 <
pl−p0
l .
Applying this reasoning inductively, we get the desired result.
Corollary 3.10 For any anonymous technology function (p,c) that has a unimodal probability
of success, there exists an 1 ≤ l ≤ n such that the ﬁrst transition in the non-strategic case is from
0t ol agents (where l is the smallest value that satisﬁes
pl−p0
l >
pl+1−p0
l+1 ) followed by all remaining
n − l transitions.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that the conditions of Lemma 3.7 are met. We know from Lemma 3.9,
that f(i) is unimodal, so condition 1 is satisﬁed. We also know from the proof of Lemma 3.9, that
if
pi−p0
i <
pi−1−p0
i−1 ,t h e npi − pi−1 <p i−1 − pi−2.S i n c e
pi−p0
i <
pi−1−p0
i−1 for all i>l , pi − pi−1 <
pi−1 − pi−2 for all i>land condition 2 is satisﬁed.
Lemma 3.11 The probability of success function for any threshold technology is unimodal.
Proof. Denote the probability of success when contracting with j agents as P(n,j,≥ k). More
speciﬁcally, let P(n,j,≥ k) denote the probability of success when you contract with j agents out
n and at least k succeed. Note that, ∆j+1 = P(n,j+1,≥ k)−P(n,j,≥ k)=( β−α)·(P(n−1,j,≥
k−1)−P(n−1,j,≥ k)) = (β−α)·P(n−1,j,= k−1), where P(n−1,j,= k−1) is the probability
that exactly k − 1 agents succeed when j agents are contracted out of the n − 1. Note that:
P(n−1,j+1,= k−1)−P(n−1,j,= k−1) = (β −α)·(P(n−2,j,= k−2)−P(n−2,j,= k−1)).
Note that the discrete distribution: P(n−2,j,0),P(n−2,j,1),...,P(n−2,j,n−2) is the convolution
of two binomial random variables. Since binomial random variables are strongly unimodal and the
convolution of any two strongly unimodal function is also strongly unimodal, we know that the
distribution: P(n − 2,j,0),P(n − 2,j,1),...,P(n − 2,j,n− 2) is strongly unimodal. Note that if
(P(n−2,j,= k−2) <P(n−2,j,= k−1)), this means the mode of this distribution is greater than
k−1. Therefore the mode of the distribution, P(n−2,j+1,0),P(n−2,j+1,1),...,P(n−2,j+1,n−
2), is also greater than k−1, so we know (P(n−2,j+1,= k−2) <P(n−2,j+1,= k−1)). Hence we
know if P(n−1,j+1,= k−1) <P(n−1,j,= k−1), P(n−1,j+2,= k−1) <P(n−1,j+1,= k−1),
which gives us that ∆j is a unimodal function.
16Lemma 3.13 The discrete valued function,
Qi
pi−p0, is convex.
Proof. Since 1
∆i is log-convex (Lemma A.1) and
pi
pi−p0 is log-convex (Lemma A.3), we know that
pi
∆i(pi−p0) is also log-convex. Since a log convex function is also convex, we know that
pi+1
∆i+1(pi+1−p0)−
pi
∆i(pi−p0) >
pi
∆i(pi−p0) −
pi−1
∆i−1(pi−1−p0) for all i. Therefore we know that
pi+1·(i+1)
∆i+1(pi+1−p0) −
pi·(i+1)
∆i(pi−p0) >
pi·(i−1)
∆i(pi−p0) −
pi−1
∆i−1(pi−1−p0). Adding
pi
∆i(pi−p0) to both sides,
pi+1·(i+1)
∆i+1(pi+1−p0) −
pi·i
∆i(pi−p0) >
pi·i
∆i(pi−p0) −
pi−1
∆i−1(pi−1−p0), as desired.
Lemma 3.14 There exists a value of 1 ≤ la ≤ n such that
Qi
Qla >
pi−p0
pla−p0 for all i ￿= la.
Proof. Since
Qi
pi−p0 is convex,
Qi+1
pi+1−p0−
Qi
pi−p0 >
Qi
pi−p0−
Qi−1
pi−1−p0 for all i. Therefore if
Qi
pi−p0−
Qi−1
pi−1−p0 >
0, then
Qi+1
pi+1−p0 −
Qi
pi−p0 > 0. Let la be the smallest l such that
Ql+1
pl+1−p0 −
Ql
pl−p0, therefore we know
that
Qi
pi−p0 >
Qi+1
pi+1−p0 for all 1 ≤ i<l a and
Qi
pi−p0 <
Qi+1
pi+1−p0 for all la ≤ i<n ,s o
Qi
Qla >
pi−p0
pla−p0 for
all i ￿= la.I f
Qi
pi−p0 −
Qi−1
pi−1−p0 < 0 for all i,t h e n
Q1
p1−p0 >
Q2
p2−p0 >. . .>
Qn
pn−p0,s o
Qi
Q1 >
pi−p0
p1−p0 for all
i ￿= 1.
Lemma 3.16 We have
Qi+1−Qi
pi+1−pi >
Qi−Qi−1
pi−pi−1 for all i>l a where la is the smallest value such that
Qla
pla−p0 <
Qla+1
pla+1 .
Proof. We know for all i ≥ la,
Qi
pi−p0 <
Qi+1
pi+1−p0 or in other words
pi·i
∆i(pi−p0) <
pi+1·(i+1)
∆i+1(pi+1−p0).S i n c e
pi
pi−p0 >
pi+1
pi+1−p0 for any value of i, we know that i
∆i < i+1
∆i+1. Note that if
pi−p0
i >
pi+1−p0
i+1 ,i tm u s t
be that ∆i+1 < ∆i,s i n c ep is unimodal, so
pi+1
∆i+1 >
pi
∆i.I f
pi−p0
i ≤
pi+1−p0
i+1 , then it must be that
∆i
pi >
∆i+1
pi+1 or in other words,
pi+1
∆i+1 >
pi
∆i. Note that if
pi+1
∆i+1 >
pi
∆i,t h e n
pi+1
∆i+1 ·
pi
pi+1 >
pi
∆i ·
pi−1
pi or in
other words
pi
∆i+1 >
pi−1
∆i ,s i n c ep is log-concave.
Since
pi
pi−p0 >
pi+1
pi+1−p0, it must be that i+1
∆i+1 > i
∆i if
pi·i
∆i(pi−p0) <
pi+1·(i+1)
∆i+1(pi+1−p0).T h u s i+1
∆i+1 > i
∆i
for all i ≥ la.
We know from Lemma A.1 that 1
∆i is a log-convex function so therefore 1
∆i+1 − 1
∆i > 1
∆i − 1
∆i−1
for all i. Therefore we know that i+1
∆i+1 − i+1
∆i > i−1
∆i − i−1
∆i−1 for all i. Adding 1
∆i to both sides we get
that i+1
∆i+1 − i
∆i > i
∆i − i−1
∆i−1 for all i. Combining this with the fact that
pi+1
∆i+1 >
pi
∆i for all i ≥ l∗
and i+1
∆i+1 > i
∆i for all i ≥ la, we get that
pi
∆i+1( i+1
∆i+1 − i
∆i)+ i+1
∆i+1 >
pi−1
∆i ( i
∆i − i−1
∆i−1)+ i
∆i for all
i ≥ la as desired.
Lemma A.1. ∆i is log-concave.
Proof. ∆i = pi −pi−1 = P(n,i,≥ k)−P(n,i−1,≥ k), where P(n,i,≥ k) is the probability that at
least k agents succeed when i succeed with probability β and n − i succeed with probability of α.
Note that P(n,i,≥ k)−P(n,i−1,≥ k)=( β −α)·(P(n−1,i−1,≥ k −1)−P(n−1,i−1,≥
k)) = (β −α)·P(n−1,i−1,= k −1), where P(n−1,i−1,= k −1) is the probability that exactly
k−1 agents succeed when i−1 agents succeed with probability β and n−i succeed with probability
α.
We abbreviate the following: fi+1 = P(n − 1,i+1 ,= k − 1), fi = P(n − 1,i,= k − 1) and
fi−1 = P(n − 1,i− 1,= k − 1). It suﬃces to show that: f2
i ≥ fi+1fi−1.
We can write:
fi+1 = β · P(n − 2,i,= k − 2) + (1 − β) · P(n − 2,i,= k − 1)
17fi = α · P(n − 2,i,= k − 2) + (1 − α) · P(n − 2,i,= k − 1)
fi = β · P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 2) + (1 − β) · P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 1)
fi−1 = α · P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 2) + (1 − α) · P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 1)
Note that:
fi+1fi−1 = αβP(n−2,i,= k−2)P(n−2,i−1,= k−2)+α(1−β)P(n−2,i,= k−1)P(n−2,i−1,=
k−2)+β(1−α)P(n−2,i,= k−2)P(n−2,i−1,= k−1)+(1−α)(1−β)P(n−2,i,= k−1)P(n−2,i−1,=
k − 1)
Also note that:
fifi = αβP(n−2,i,= k−2)P(n−2,i−1,= k−2)+α(1−β)P(n−2,i,= k−2)P(n−2,i−1,=
k−1)+β(1−α)P(n−2,i,= k−1)P(n−2,i−1,= k−2)+(1−α)(1−β)P(n−2,i,= k−1)P(n−2,i−1,=
k − 1)
f2
i −fi−1fi+1 =( β−α)(P(n−2,i,= k−1)P(n−2,i−1,= k−2)−P(n−2,i−1,= k−1)P(n−2,i,=
k − 2)).
Note that we can then write:
P(n − 2,i,= k − 1) = βP(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2) + (1 − β)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 1)
P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 1) = αP(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2) + (1 − α)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 1)
P(n − 2,i,= k − 2) = βP(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 3) + (1 − β)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2)
P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 2) = αP(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 3) + (1 − α)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2)
So we can write:
P(n − 2,i,= k − 1)P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 2) = (βP(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2) + (1 − β)P(n − 3,i− 1,=
k−1))(αP(n−3,i−1,= k−3)+(1−α)P(n−3,i−1,= k−2)) = αβP(n−3,i−1,= k−2)P(n−3,i−1,=
k − 3) + β(1 − α)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2) + α(1 − β)P(n − 3,i− 1,=
k − 1)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 3) + (1 − α)(1 − β)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 1)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2)
And:
P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 1)P(n − 2,i,= k − 2) = (αP(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2) + (1 − α)P(n − 3,i− 1,=
k−1))(βP(n−3,i−1,= k−3)+(1−β)P(n−3,i−1,= k−2)) = αβP(n−3,i−1,= k−2)P(n−3,i−1,=
k − 3) + β(1 − α)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 3)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 1) + α(1 − β)P(n − 3,i− 1,=
k − 2)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2) + (1 − α)(1 − β)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 1)P(n − 3,i− 1,= k − 2)
So (P(n − 2,i,= k − 1)P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 2) − P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 1)P(n − 2,i,= k − 2)) =
(β−α)(P(n−3,i−1,= k−2)P(n−3,i−1,= k−2)−P(n−3,i−1,= k−1)P(n−3,i−1,= k−3))
Note that P(n,j,k) for ﬁxed n,k is strongly unimodal since it is the convolution of two binomial
random variables, which are also strongly unimodal. Therefore we know that P(n − 3,i− 1,=
k−2)P(n−3,i−1,= k−2)−P(n−3,i−1,= k−1)P(n−3,i−1,= k−3) > 0, so f2
j −fj−1fj+1 > 0
for all n>3 and all n>k>2.
Now we address the k = 2 case. When k = 2:
fi+1 = β · (1 − β)i(1 − α)n−i−2 +( 1− β) · P(n − 2,i,= k − 1)
fi = α · (1 − β)i(1 − α)n−i−2 +( 1− α) · P(n − 2,i,= k − 1)
fi = β · (1 − β)i−1(1 − α)n−i−1 +( 1− β) · P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 1)
fi−1 = α · (1 − β)i−1(1 − α)n−i−1 +( 1− α) · P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 1)
Note that:
fi+1fi−1 = β · (1− β)i(1− α)n−i−2α · (1− β)i−1(1− α)n−i−1 + α(1− β)P(n− 2,i,= k − 1)(1−
β)i−1(1−α)n−i−1+β(1−α)(1−β)i(1−α)n−i−2P(n−2,i−1,= k−1)+(1−α)(1−β)P(n−2,i,=
k − 1)P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 1)
Also note that:
fifi = α · (1 − β)i(1 − α)n−i−2β · (1 − β)i−1(1 − α)n−i−1 + α(1 − β)(1 − β)i(1 − α)n−i−2P(n −
2,i−1,= k −1)+β(1−α)P(n−2,i,= k −1)(1−β)i−1(1−α)n−i−1 +(1−α)(1−β)P(n−2,i,=
k − 1)P(n − 2,i− 1,= k − 1)
18f2
i −fi−1fi+1 =( β −α)(P(n−2,i,= k −1)(1−β)i−1(1−α)n−i−1 −P(n−2,i−1,= k −1)(1−
β)i(1 − α)n−i−2)=( β − α)2(1 − β)i−1(1 − α)n−i−2P(n − 2,i,= k − 1) > 0.
Finally we consider the case that n = 3 (and k = 2 necessarily). For the n = 3 case:
P(3,1,≥ 2) − P(3,0,≥ 2) = (β − α)P(2,0,= 1) = 2α(1 − α)
P(3,2,≥ 2) − P(3,1,≥ 2) = (β − α)P(2,1,= 1) = β(1 − α)+α(1 − β)
P(3,3,≥ 2) − P(3,2,≥ 2) = (β − α)P(2,2,= 1) = 2β(1 − β)
We know that: (β(1 − α) − α(1 − β)) > 0
β2(1 − α)2 +2 αβ(1 − α)(1 − β)+α2(1 − β)2 > 4αβ(1 − α)(1 − β)
(P(3,2,≥ 2) − P(3,1,≥ 2))2 > (P(3,1,≥ 2) − P(3,0,≥ 2))(P(3,3,≥ 2) − P(3,2,≥ 2))
Now consider the case that k = 1. When k = 1, pi −pi−1 =( 1−(1−β)i(1−α)n−i)−(1−(1−
β)i−1(1 − α)n−i+1)=( 1− β)i−1(1 − α)n−i(β − α. Therefore ∆i/∆i−1 =
1−β
1−α for any i and ∆i is a
log-concave function.
Now consider the case that k = n.W h e n k = n, pi − pi−1 = βiαn−i − βi−1αn − i +1 =
βi−1αn−i(β − α). Therefore ∆i/∆i−1 =
β
α for any i and ∆i is a log-concave function.
Lemma A.2. pi is log-concave.
Proof. Since ∆i is a discrete function, we know that ∆i+1∆1 − ∆i∆2 +∆ i+1∆2 − ∆i∆3 + ... +
∆i+1∆i−1−∆i∆i < 0s o∆ i+1∆1−∆i∆2+∆i+1∆2−∆i∆3+...+∆i+1∆i−1−∆i∆i−∆i∆1 < 0. In
other words, we know ∆i+1(∆1+...+∆i)−∆i(∆1+...+∆i)−∆i∆i+1, or ∆i+1pi−∆ipi−∆i∆i+1 < 0
or p2
i > (pi +∆ i+1)(pi − ∆i)=pi+1pi−1, as desired.
Lemma A.3.
pi
pi−p0 is log-convex.
Proof. Since p is log concave, we know that p2
i >p i+1pi−1 =( pi +∆ i+1)(pi −∆i) or in other words
∆i∆i+1+∆ ipi−∆i+1pi > 0, which gives us that p0(pi−p0)(∆i∆i+1+∆ ipi−∆i+1pi > 0) and that
p0((2pi − p0)∆i∆i+1 − (pi − p0)(∆ipi − ∆i+1pi)) > 0, which means that p2
i − (pi − p0)2)∆i∆i+1 −
p0pi(pi−p0)(∆ipi−∆i+1pi) > 0. Therefore we have: (pi−p0)2(∆i+1pi−∆ipi)−p2
i(∆i+1(pi−p0)−
∆i(pi−p0))+p2
i −(pi−p0)2)∆i∆i+1 > 0, so (pi−p0)2(p2
i +∆i+1pi−∆i−∆i∆i+1) >p 2
i(pi−p0)2+
∆i+1(pi−p0−∆i)p2
i −∆i(pi−p0)p2
i, or (pi−p0)2(pi+∆i+1)(pi−∆i) >p 2
i(pi−p0+∆i+1)(pi−p0−∆i),
which gives us (
pi−p0
pi )2 >
pi+1−p0
pi+1
pi−1−p0
pi−1 , as desired.
B Proofs from Section 4
Lemma 4.2 For the OR technology, the price of unaccountability occurs at a transition in the
agency case, as opposed to a transition in the non-strategic case.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that for a ﬁxed agency contract, the social welfare ratio is increasing as v
increases. First consider the OR technology. We know that for all i<j ,
pj−p0
j <
pi−p0
i . Therefore
we have that for all i<j ,
pj
j <
pi
i .I fipj <j p i,w eh a v e :
19jpi(v￿ − v) >i p j(v￿ − v) for any v￿ >v
−jpiv − ipjv￿ > −jpiv￿ − ipjv
−jcpiv − icpjv￿ > −jcpiv￿ − icpjv
pivpjv￿ − jcpiv − icpjv￿ + icjc > piv￿pjv − jcpiv￿ − icpjv + icjc
(pjv￿ − jc)(piv − ic) > (pjv − jc)(piv￿ − ic)
pjv￿ − jc
piv￿ − ic
>
pjv − jc
piv − ic
for any v￿ >v
Therefore, we know for ﬁxed non-strategic and ﬁxed agency contracts, the social welfare ratio
increases and v increases. Finally, we know that
pj+1v∗−(j+1)c
piv∗−ic =
pjv∗−jc
piv∗−ic,w h e r ev∗ is the point at
which a principal is indiﬀerent between contracting between j agents and contracting with j +1
agents. Therefore we know, for ﬁxed agency contract, the social welfare ratio is increasing as v
increases.
Theorem 4.5 The POU for the OR technology is bounded by 2 for all α,β =1− α and n.
Proof. To establish this result, it suﬃces to show that the social welfare ratio is bounded everywhere
by 2. Given Lemma 4.2, it suﬃces to consider only transition points in the agency case, so let us
consider the social welfare ratio at a transition in the agency case. Let us consider the social welfare
ratio at vi,i+1, where the principal is indiﬀerent between contracting with i agents and i+1 agents
in the agency case. Also suppose at vi,i+1, the optimal non-strategic contract is j,w h e r en ≥ j>i .
Therefore, we can write the social welfare ratio as:
pjvi,i+1−j
pivi,i+1−i. We want to show that
pjvi,i+1−j
pivi,i+1−i ≤ 2.
If 2pi − pj > 0, then this statement is equivalent to vi,i+1 ≥
2i−j
2pi−pj.I f 2 pi − pj < 0, then this
statement is equivalent to vi,i+1 ≤
j−2i
pj−2pi.
First we consider the case that 2pi − pj > 0. First suppose that 2i − j ≤ 0, then we know that
2i−j
2pi−pj < 0, so vi,i+1 ≥
2i−j
2pi−pj. Therefore it suﬃces to consider the case that 2i − j>0. Since
the optimal non-strategic contract is j at vi,i+1, we know that 1
∆j+1 ≥ vi,i+1 ≥ 1
∆j. Therefore, it
suﬃces to show that 1
∆j ≥
2i−j
2pi−pj.S i n c e2 i−j<jand ∆j < ∆j−1 <. . .<∆1, we know that ∆j <
p2i−j
2i−j =
pi−(pi−p2i−j)
2i−j =
pi−(∆i+∆i−1+...+∆2i−j+1)
2i−j <
pi−(∆j+∆j−1+...+∆i+1)
2i−j =
pi−(pj−pi)
2i−j =
2pi−pj
2i−j .
Now we consider the case that 2pi − pj < 0. Since the optimal non-strategic contract is j
at vi,i+1, we know that 1
∆j+1 ≥ vi,i+1 ≥ 1
∆j. Therefore it suﬃces to show that 1
∆j+1 ≤
j−2i
pj−2pi or
pj−2pi ≤ (j−2i)(pj+1−pj). We can write pj =1 −θjq0,w h e r eθ =
1−β
1−α and q0 =( 1 −α)n. Therefore
it suﬃces to show that (1 − θjq0) − 2(1 − θiq0) ≤ (j − 2i)(1 − θj+1q0 − (1 − θjq0)) or equivalently
−1+2 θiq0 − θjq0 ≤ (j − 2i)θjq0(1 − θ) or equivalently, θiq0(2 − θj−i − (j − 2i)θj−i(1 − θ)) ≤ 1.
Therefore it suﬃces to show that θiq0 ≤ 1
2. θiq0 =( 1− β)i(1 − α)n−i.S i n c e 1 − β = α<1
2,w e
know that (1 − β)i(1 − α)n−i < 1
2 for all i>0.
Therefore the only remaining case is i = 0 and 2p0 − pj < 0. We note that when i = 0,
2i−j<0, for any value of j. We also notice that if 2p0 −1 > 0, then 2p0 −pj > 0. In other words
if α ≥ 1−
n
￿
1
2,t h e n2 p0 −pj > 0. For n ≥ 3, the RHS is at most 0.207, therefore if α>0.207 and
n ≥ 3, we know from above that
pjv0,1−j
p0v0,1 ≤ 2. (The n = 2 case is established in [7]).
Now suppose that α ≤ 5−
√
5
10 . This means that α<0.276. If α ≤ 5−
√
5
10 ,t h e n :
0 ≤ 5 · α2 − 5 · α +1
202 · α − 2 · α2 ≤ α2 − α + α2 +1− 2 · α + α2
2 · α · (1 − α) ≤ α2 − α · (1 − α)+( 1− α)2
α·(1−α)
α2−α·(1−α)+(1−α)2 ≤ 1
2
θ
θ2−θ+1 ≤ 1
2,w h e r eθ = α
1−α =
1−β
1−α
Since q0 > 1
2 ≥ θ
θ2−θ+1,s o
θ ≤ q0 · (θ2 − θ + 1)
θ − θ2 · q0 ≤ q0 − θ · q0
(1 − θ · q0) · θ ≤ (1 − θ) · q0
(1 − θ · q0)θ(1 − θ)q0 ≤ (1 − θ)q0(1 − θ)q0
p1(p2 − p1) ≤ (p1 − p0)2 (eq. *)
We now use eq. * to prove inductively that pjp1 − i · (p1 − p0)2 ≤ 2p1p0 Base case (j = 2): We
combine p2
1−(p1−p0)2 ≤ 2p1p0 with eq. *, we get p2
1−(p1−p0)2+p1(p2−p1) ≤ (p1−p0)2+2p1p0,
or p1p2 − 2(p1 − p0)2 ≤ 2p1p0.
Inductive Step: We are given that pjp1 − j(p1 − p0)2 ≤ 2p1p0.I f p1(p2 − p1) ≤ (p1 − p0)2,
p1(pj+1 − pj) ≤ (p1 − p0)2 for all j ≥ 2, because pj+1 − pj <p 2 − p1 (diminishing returns to scale
of the OR function). Combining p1(pj+1 −pj) ≤ (p1 −p0)2 with pjp1 −j(p1 −p0)2 ≤ 2p1p0, we get
p1pj − j(p1 − p0)2 + p1(pj+1 − pj) ≤ (p1 − p0)2 +2 p1p0, or p1pj+1 − (j + 1)(p1 − p0)2 ≤ 2p1p0.
Theorem 4.7 The Price of Unaccountability for the threshold technology is not bounded for
all values of k ≥ 2 and n. More speciﬁcally, when α → 0, POU →∞ .
Proof. We show that there exists a social welfare ratio that approaches ∞ as α → 0. This is
suﬃcient to establish the desired result since the POU is described as the maximum social welfare
ratio (where the maximum is taken over v). We focus on the social welfare ratio at the point of the
ﬁrst transition in the agency case. We can write this social welfare ratio as
pj·v−j·c
p0·v ,w h e r ev is the
point of the ﬁrst transition in the agency case and j is the optimal contract for the non-strategic
case at v. We know from Lemma 4.8, that the ﬁrst transition in the agency case jumps from 0
to i ≥ k.W e w r i t e v =
pi·i·c
(pi−pi−1)(pi−p0),w h e r ev is the point at where the principal is indiﬀerent
between contracting with 0 agents and i agents in the agency case. We know from Lemma 4.8 that
k ≤ i ≤ j. Therefore, we can write the social welfare ratio at v as
pjpiic−jc(pi−pi−1)(pi−p0)
p0piic . Note
that this ratio is at least as big as
pipiic−ic(pi−pi−1)(pi−p0)
p0piic or
pipi−1+pip0−pi−1p0
pip0 =
pi−1
p0 +1−
pi−1
pi .
As α → 0, we see that
pi−1
p0 →∞and 1 ≥
pi−1
pi ≥ 0, therefore this ratio approaches ∞. Hence, as
α → 0,
pjpiic−jc(pi−pi−1)(pi−p0)
p0piic →∞ . Hence, the POU approaches ∞.
Lemma 4.8 As α → 0, we know that k ≤ la ≤ lns,w h e r ela is the ﬁrst transition in the agency
case and lns is the ﬁrst transition in the non-strategic case.
Proof. Recall that the ﬁrst transition in the non-strategy case occurs to a value lns that satisﬁes
argmin
i
i·c
pi−p0. As α → 0, pi − p0 approaches 0, for all i<k . Therefore, i·c
pi−p0 →∞ . As α → 0,
i·c
pi−p0 approaches a constant for i ≥ k. Thus for suﬃciently small α, the minimum occurs at an
lns ≥ k.
Now we focus on the agency case. Recall that the ﬁrst transition occurs to a value la that
satisﬁes argmin
i
pi·i·c
(pi−pi−1)·(pi−p0). We note that as α → 0,
pi
pi−p0 → 1 for any i. Therefore as α → 0,
this quantity approaches ∞ for all i<k .W h e ni = k, as α → 0, this quantity becomes k·c
pk ,w h i c h
is a constant. When i>k , as α → 0, this quantity approaches i·c
pi−pi−1. Thus the minimum value
occurs at a value la ≥ k. Combining this with Lemma 3.18, we know that k ≤ la ≤ lns.
21C Proofs from Section 5
Lemma 5.1 If the principal decides to contract with j · m + a agents for some j ∈ Z+ and
some 0 ≤ a<m , the probability of success is maximized by fully contracting j AND gates and
contracting with a remaining agents on the same AND gate.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary contract of exactly j · m + a agents (that is not the case described
above). Suppose that this contract speciﬁes the following number of agents contracted on each AND
gate ˆ x =( x1,...,x q). Suppose that there exists an i and j such that xi ≤ xj <m . We show that the
contract ˆ y =( x1,...,x i − 1,...,x j +1 ,...,x q) has strictly greater success probability. We can write
the success probability of the contract ˆ y as follows: p(ˆ y)=βxj+1αm−xj−1βxi−1αm−xi+1P(n−2,k−
1) + βxj+1αm−xj−1(1 − βxi−1αm−xi+1)P(n − 2,k− 1) + βxi−1αm−xi+1(1 − βxj+1αm−xj−1)P(n −
2,k− 1) + (1 − βxj+1αm−xj−1)(1 − βxi−1αm−xi+1)P(n − 2,k) And we can similarly write the
probability of success for ˆ x. We know that βxjαm−xj−1(β − α)(P(n − 2,k− 1) − P(n − 2,k)) >
βxi−1αm−xi(β − α)(P(n − 2,k− 1) − P(n − 2,k)) for any xi ≤ xj. Therefore, we know that
p(ˆ y) >p (ˆ x), as desired.
Lemma 5.2 For any principal’s value v, the optimal contract involves a set of fully contracted
AND gate.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a principal’s value v>0 and a j,w h e r ej = i · m + a for some
a>0, such that j is the optimal contract. In an abuse of notation, we say that the probability
of success for this contract is p(j). (Note that the preceding Lemma tells us exactly how these
agents are contracted). If there exists a v>0 such that this contract is optimal then p(j)v − j>
p(j − 1)v − (j − 1), or v> 1
p(j)−p(j−1),w h e r ep(j − 1) is the probability of success of contracting
with j − 1 agents. In what follows, we show that p(j + 1) − p(j) >p (j) − p(j − 1). We can write
p(j)=βaαm−aP(n − 1,k− 1) + (1 − βaαm−a)P(n − 1,k)=P(n − 1,k)+βaαm−a(P(n − 1,k−
1) − P(n,k − 1)). Therefore, p(j + 1) = P(n − 1,k)+βa+1αm−a−1(P(n − 1,k− 1) − P(n,k − 1))
and p(j − 1) = P(n − 1,k)+βa−1αm−a+1(P(n − 1,k− 1) − P(n,k − 1)). Hence p(j + 1) − p(j)=
βa+1αm−a−1(P(n−1,k−1)−P(n,k−1))−βaαm−a(P(n−1,k−1)−P(n,k−1)) = βaαm−a−1(β−
α)(P(n−1,k−1)−P(n,k−1)) and p(j)−p(j−1) = βa−1αm−a(β−α)(P(n−1,k−1)−P(n,k−1)),
which gives us p(j + 1) − p(j) >p (j) − p(j − 1) as desired. Therefore if v> 1
p(j)−p(j−1),t h e nt h i s
means v> 1
p(j+1)−p(j), and j cannot be the optimal contract.
Theorem 5.3 The transition behavior for the majority-of-AND technology in the non-strategic
case has a ﬁrst transition to l fully contracted AND gates, where 1 ≤ l ≤ n, followed by each
subsequent transition of fully contracted AND gates.
Proof. From Lemma 5.2, it suﬃces to consider only the contracts that involve fully contracted
AND gates. This is equivalent to a threshold function with a probability of success βn for a high
eﬀort agent and a probability of success αn for a low eﬀort agent. Using Theorem 3.12, we get the
desired result.
Lemma 5.5 Consider an integer i such that i = a · j + b,w h e r e0≤ b<j .F i x i n g i,t h e
probability of success for a majority-of-ORs function is maximized when a+1 agents are contracted
on each of b OR gates and a agents are contracted on each of j − b OR gates.
Proof. Consider an allocation of contracts to OR gates: ˆ x =( x1,x 2,...,x m). If ˆ x is not the
allocation of contracts in which a + 1 agents are contracted on each of b OR gates and a agents
22are contracted on each of m − b OR gates, then there exists an i such that xi >aand a j
such that xj <a . Now consider the agents contracted for the ith OR gate, label these agents
a1,a 2,...,a xi. Likewise consider the agents contracted for the jth OR gate, label these agents
a￿
1,a ￿
2,...,a ￿
xj. We use the notation al = 1 if agent l succeeds and al = 0 if agent l does not succeed.
Consider the following three events: A =( a1 =1∨ a2 =1∨ ... ∨ axi−1 = 1), B =( axi = 1), and
C =( a￿
1 =1∨a￿
2 =1∨...∨a￿
xj = 1). We can write the probability of success of a proﬁle ˆ x in terms
of these three events. We can also write the probability of success of the proﬁle ˆ y in terms of these
three events, where ˆ y is the proﬁle obtained from ˆ x, by contracting one less agent on the ith OR
gate and one more agent on the jth OR gate. p(ˆ x)=P r ( A ∧ B ∧ C) · pm−2,k−2 +P r ( A ∧ B ∧ C) ·
pm−2,k−2+Pr(A∧B ∧C)·pm−2,k−2+Pr(A∧B ∧C)·pm−2,k−1+Pr(A∧B ∧C)·pm−2,k−1+Pr(A∧
B ∧C)·pm−2,k−1 +Pr(A∧B ∧C)·pm−2,k−1 +Pr(A∧B ∧C)·pm−2,k,w h e r epm,k is the probability
that at least k agents succeed out of m. Similarly, p(ˆ y)=P r ( A ∧ B ∧ C) · pm−2,k−2 +P r ( A ∧ B ∧
C) · pm−2,k−2 +P r ( A ∧ B ∧ C) · pm−2,k−1 +P r ( A ∧ B ∧ C) · pm−2,k−1 +P r ( A ∧ B ∧ C) · pm−2,k−2 +
Pr(A ∧ B ∧ C) · pm−2,k−1 +P r ( A ∧ B ∧ C) · pm−2,k−1 +P r ( A ∧ B ∧ C) · pm−2,k. Therefore, we can
write p(ˆ y)−p(ˆ x)=( P r ( A∧B ∧C)−Pr(A∧B ∧C))·(pm−2,k−2 −pm−2,k−1). It is easy to see that
pm−2,k−2 −pm−2,k−1 > 0. Note that A,B,C are all independent events, therefore Pr(A∧B ∧C)=
Pr(A)·Pr(B)·Pr(C) and Pr(A∧B∧C)=P r ( A)·Pr(B)·Pr(C). Since xi−1 >x j,P r ( A) > Pr(C)
and Pr(C) > Pr(A), which gives us (Pr(A ∧ B ∧ C) − Pr(A ∧ B ∧ C)) · (pm−2,k−2 − pm−2,k−1) > 0
and p(ˆ y) − p(ˆ x) > 0 as desired.
Lemma 5.6 The ﬁrst transition for the non-strategic case of the majority-of-OR technology
jumps from contracting with 0 agents to l agents, where 1 ≤ l ≤ k, followed by all remaining
transitions, where the transitions proceed in such a way so that no OR gate has more than 1 more
agent contracted as compared to any other OR gate.
Proof. First we show that the ﬁrst transition jumps from 0 to a value of at most k. The majority of
OR function which is equivalent to a majority function with α￿ =1 −(1−α)j and β￿ =1 −α(1−α)j−1.
As α → 0, note that the ﬁrst transition jumps from 0 to k. As α increases, so does α￿ +β￿, as does
the expected number of OR gates that succeed when you contract with k agents. Therefore we
know for all α and β =1− α, ﬁrst transition occurs to a value l that is at most k.S i n c et h eﬁ r s t
transition jumps from a value 0 to l (where l ≤ k), there exists a v such that plv−l>p l−1v−(l−1)
and pl+1v − (l + 1) <p lv − l, or in other words, there exists a v such that 1
pl+1−pl >v> 1
pl−pl−1.
This means that pl −pl−1 >p l+1 −pl. From Lemma 3.11, we know that (pl+1 −pl)−(pl −pl−1)=
(β￿ − α￿)2(P(m − 2,l− 1,= k − 2) − P(m − 2,l− 1,= k − 1)), where α￿ =1− (1 − α)j and
β￿ =1 −(1−β)(1−α)j−1.I ft h i si s< 0, it means that P(m−2,l−1,= k−2) <P(m−2,l−1,= k−1)
and the expected number of agents that succeed when you have l−1 agents succeed with probability
β￿ and m−l −1 agents succeed with probability α￿ is greater than k −1. Lemma 3.11 also tells us
that pl+i − pl+i−1 >p l+i+1 − pl+i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − l − 1.
Now we consider the marginal increase in probability of success of contracting with the m+1 st
agent. We can write the marginal contribution of the m +1 st agent as pm+1 − pm = P(m,1,≥
k)−P(m,0,≥ k)=( β￿￿−α￿￿)(P(m−1,0,≥ k−1)−P(m−1,0,≥ k)) = (β￿￿−α￿￿)P(m−1,0,= k−1)
(with α￿￿ =1− (1 − β)(1 − α)j−1 and β￿￿ =1− (1 − β)2(1 − α)j−2). Observe that pm − pm−1 =
P(m,m,≥ k) − P(m,m − 1,≥ k)=( β￿ − α￿)(P(m − 1,m− 1,≥ k − 1) − P(m − 1,m− 1,≥ k)) =
(β￿ − α￿)P(m − 1,m− 1,= k − 1) (with α￿ =1− (1 − α)j and β￿ =1− (1 − β)(1 − α)j−1). Note
that (1 − β)(1 − α)j−2(β − α) < (1 − α)j−1(β − α), so β￿￿ − α￿￿ <β ￿ − α￿. Therefore, we know that
pm+1 − pm <p m − pm−1. Using the same arguments as above we get that contracting with each
successive agent has a smaller marginal increase in probability of success than the previous agent,
which gives us the desired result.
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